Abstract--In this paper, we introduce a class of totally convex multichoice cooperative games a.nd prove that the Shapley value of such games is always in the core.
INTRODUCTION
Hsiao and Raghavan [1] introduced a class of multichoice cooperative games and tbund its Shapley value using an axiomatic approach. Later, Nouweland et al. [2] determined the Shapley value ~br multichoice cooperative games following its probabilistic interpretation. Howewu. the w~lues obtained by these two methods are quite different. In our paper, while avoiding the problem of inconsistency of the Shapley value between Hsiao-Raghavan and Nouweland, we consider a necessary and sufficient condition for the Shapley vahle by Nouweland to be in the core of a multichoice cooperative game.
It is well known that in the class of cooperative games in tile characteristic function form, the Shapley value is in the core if the characteristic function is either convex [3] , aw~rage convex [4] , or totally convex [5] . The latter paper shows that the class of totally convex games inchnles tha.t of average convex games. We discuss conditions for the Shapley value to be in the core tot the ('lass of multichoice cooperative games.
MULTICHOICE COOPERATIVE GAME
First of all, we describe the multichoice cooperative game (MCG) introduced ill [1] . Let N -= {1, 2,..., 'n} be the set of players, M~ = {0, 1, 2 .... ,m4} the set of activity levels of player i ¢ N. Vv'e assume that mi = L, L ¢ R +, for all i c N as in [1] . A coalition ill MCG is denoted by a vector s = (Sl,... G(v, N) .
TOTAL CONVEXITY
In [2] , the following procedure of construction was proposed for the Shapley value. Suppose that a given coalition s E M is formed step-by-step, starting from the zero coalition 0 = (0,..., 0). On each stage of the procedure, one of the players has to increase his activity level by 1. Thus, the coalition s E M will be created after k(s) = ~i:~#0 si steps, i.e., each player i E N will reach his level of activity s~ in s. --5~(s). 
Define M + = {(i,j) ] i E N,j E M~ \ {0}}. An admissible order is a bijection w:M + --~ {1,2,... ,~-~ieNmi} satisfying w((i,j)) < w((i,j + 1)) for all i c~N and j E {1, 2,..., mi -1}. The number of the admissible orders for G(v, N) is
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DEFINITION. G(V, N) is called a totally convex multichoice game if for any coMition t E M,
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Moving backwards, from (3.4) to (3.2), we arrive at the fact that, if the Shapley value of G(v, N) lies in tile core, then G(v, N) is totally convex. Thus, we have proved the following theorem.
TtlE()REM. A necessm 3" and sufficient condition for the Slgapley value 4) of MCG G(v, N) to be in the core C(v, N) is total convexity of G(v, N).
The proof of the theorem is also valid for the games where players may have different numbers of activity levels: m~ 5A mj for i ~ j, where i,j E N.
Finally, we consider that the definition of a totally convex multichoice game coincides with another definition given by Izawa and Takahashi [5] for the class of n-person cooperative games in characteristic form. For the sake of simplicity, we draw on the following definition of total convexity proposed by Izawa and Takahashi [5] . where the summation ~ScN is taken over all nonempty subsets S of N.
